Dispositions and Habits of Mind, Part 2

Here is what Henry says about the connection between a disposition of mind and a habit of mind:

"A habit and a disposition are in the very same thing, and they differ only as complete and incomplete, such that what began in an incomplete and imperfect manner is called a disposition. When, through a received augmentation, it will reach a perfection [that is] determined and complete, the name 'disposition' no longer applies, and it is called a 'habit'. In this way, the disposition itself becomes a habit in the way that a child is to an adult, and when one becomes an adult the name 'child' no longer applies."

Dispositions and Habits of Mind

Henry of Ghent famously denies that there are such things as 'intelligible species'. Well, kind of. Henry thinks that an 'intelligible species' and a 'habit' play exactly the same explanatory role; consequently, Henry argues that we should just posit habits because that is explanatorily more parsimonious. An intelligible species is the name that various scholastic philosophers give for a person's being able to think of something. There are various ways to consider a person's being able to think of something.

Here are some ways to look at this. We might ask whether thinking of something is (a) relatively easy or (b) takes some effort, and whether your thought has (c) simple or (d) propositional intentional content (what do you think when you think of something). If (a) - (d) are sufficiently helpful, we get the following combinations.