Just for Fun

Quotable Henry: Will is to the Affection of Love as a Horse is to the Health of Its Body

"The will is a principle agent and its affection of love is an instrument, since the will has it in [its] use and its power for the purpose of being expedited and efficacious (or intense) for an action to be performed. This is like a horse, having health throughout its body, that may use it [i.e. health] for running quickly. It would be an instrument of the horse with regard to velocity in a race. And affection is like this, that insofar as it is an instrument of the will, it is love. Love is a certain health of the will, but insofar as it stimulates by its healthy temperance for the intended motion, it has the nature of an inhabitant of the principle agent, and the will an instrument to the instrument. This is like a horse who runs quickly, having been furiously agitated. The fury itself is like an inhabitant of the horse and the horse itself is an instrument [of the fury]."

Dispositions and Habits of Mind, Part 2

Here is what Henry says about the connection between a disposition of mind and a habit of mind:

"A habit and a disposition are in the very same thing, and they differ only as complete and incomplete, such that what began in an incomplete and imperfect manner is called a disposition. When, through a received augmentation, it will reach a perfection [that is] determined and complete, the name 'disposition' no longer applies, and it is called a 'habit'. In this way, the disposition itself becomes a habit in the way that a child is to an adult, and when one becomes an adult the name 'child' no longer applies."

Dispositions and Habits of Mind

Henry of Ghent famously denies that there are such things as 'intelligible species'. Well, kind of. Henry thinks that an 'intelligible species' and a 'habit' play exactly the same explanatory role; consequently, Henry argues that we should just posit habits because that is explanatorily more parsimonious. An intelligible species is the name that various scholastic philosophers give for a person's being able to think of something. There are various ways to consider a person's being able to think of something.

Here are some ways to look at this. We might ask whether thinking of something is (a) relatively easy or (b) takes some effort, and whether your thought has (c) simple or (d) propositional intentional content (what do you think when you think of something). If (a) - (d) are sufficiently helpful, we get the following combinations.

Henry of Ghent's Works Now Online

The Good News:

Gordon Wilson has put online PDF versions of all the Critical Editions of Henry's works, both the Quodlibeta and the Summa. I have added a hyperlink over on the sidebar "Henry of Ghent's Works ONLINE".

These PDFs are searchable. This will certainly help future research.

The Bad News:

Quotable Henry: On the Positive (albeit thin) Knowledge of God

Henry of Ghent, Summa Quaestionum Ordinariarum, Article 24, Question 1 (Badius, vol. 1, f.137rC) (Emended translation from Jos Decorte and Roland Teske, 'Henry of Ghent's Summa: The Questions on God's Existence and Essence Articles 21-24).

In what follows Henry ends his criticism of those who say that knowledge of God is merely privative (e.g., 'God lacks finitude') or negative (e.g., 'God is not finite').

"If, therefore, we did not at all know what God is, we would not love God at all, because we can love unseen things, but we cannot at all love unknown things, as Augustine says in book 6 of On the Trinity.

A Companion to Henry of Ghent

In a looong awaited release, Brill has published A Companion to Henry of Ghent (2011) in the series Brill's Companions to the Christian Tradition, edited by Gordan A. Wilson.

For the Table of Contents, authors, and more about this book, go here:

http://www.brill.nl/default.aspx?partid=210&pid=28432