Henry of Ghent famously denies that there are such things as 'intelligible species'. Well, kind of. Henry thinks that an 'intelligible species' and a 'habit' play exactly the same explanatory role; consequently, Henry argues that we should just posit habits because that is explanatorily more parsimonious. An intelligible species is the name that various scholastic philosophers give for a person's being able to think of something. There are various ways to consider a person's being able to think of something.
Here are some ways to look at this. We might ask whether thinking of something is (a) relatively easy or (b) takes some effort, and whether your thought has (c) simple or (d) propositional intentional content (what do you think when you think of something). If (a) - (d) are sufficiently helpful, we get the following combinations.
Here are some ways to look at this. We might ask whether thinking of something is (a) relatively easy or (b) takes some effort, and whether your thought has (c) simple or (d) propositional intentional content (what do you think when you think of something). If (a) - (d) are sufficiently helpful, we get the following combinations.