Henry of Ghent famously denies that there are such things as 'intelligible species'. Well, kind of. Henry thinks that an 'intelligible species' and a 'habit' play exactly the same explanatory role; consequently, Henry argues that we should just posit habits because that is explanatorily more parsimonious. An intelligible species is the name that various scholastic philosophers give for a person's being able to think of something. There are various ways to consider a person's being able to think of something.
Here are some ways to look at this. We might ask whether thinking of something is (a) relatively easy or (b) takes some effort, and whether your thought has (c) simple or (d) propositional intentional content (what do you think when you think of something). If (a) - (d) are sufficiently helpful, we get the following combinations.
1. (a) Some items we can think about fairly easily, and (c) the content is simple. We would use a single term like 'feline' or 'boring' and not any complete sentences (propositions) to think of the item(s).
2. (a) Some items we can think about fairly easily, and (d) the content is propositional. We would use a sentence or sentences to think of something.
3. (b) Some items we can think about only if we work at it, and (c) the content is simple. Suppose I cannot name an object that I interact with everyday, and so I stand there saying things like, 'the, uhh.. y'know.. the uhhh...... the corkscrew!'
4. (b) Some items we can think about only if we work at it, and (d) the content is propositional. Suppose deep in my memory I know lots about the 1980-81 Baseball season, but for the life of me I cannot recall it right now. But, after working at it awhile (perhaps like Google taking longer than normal to complete a search) I begin to tell you lots and lots of things about the 1980-81 Baseball season.
Suppose that (1)-(4) are sufficiently representative of the various ways we might consider someone's 'being able to think of something'.
Now, we might ask, what explains (1), (2), (3), and (4). We can at least say that the conditions for each are not exactly the same. To give full attention to each would take some time. Some philosophers might begin with easier cases and go from there. That is exactly what medieval philosophers usually do. They usually begin with (1) and move to (2), then (3) and (4). I don't mean that in every case a scholastic philosopher discusses (1), then (2), then (3), and then (4), but that this order describes generally how they go about it. In fact, most begin with (1), and (2)-(4) are up for grabs.
So far as I am aware, Henry of Ghent spends most of his efforts on (1) and (2). It seems to me that we can take what Henry says of (1) and (2) and try to construct what he would say about (3) and (4). Still, there are one or two places in which Henry tries to explain how we can undo our ability to think of something in a certain way. This isn't exactly the same as (3) and (4), but it's in the family--how can I try to get rid of the way I normally think of something?
Following Aristotle's discussion of qualities in his Categories, Henry posits that 'being able to think of something' comes in two ways, either because I have an intellectual condition or I have an intellectual state. Henry calls a condition by the name 'disposition' and a state by the name 'habit'. A condition/disposition is that by which you can think of something right now but it won't be easily accessible to you for long. A state/habit is that by which you can think of something right now and it will remain relatively easily accessible to you indefinitely.
Henry gives the following definition of a habit of mind:
"a habit is a quality that is generated in one who moves himself/herself by a cognitive desire in an action that presupposes a motion from another",
alternatively translated,
"a habit is a quality that is generated in one who moves himself/herself by a cognitive desire in an action from that which is moved from another."
[= [habitus est] qualitas generata in movente seipsum per appetitum cognitivum in actionem ex eo quod est ex alio motum]
Next time we'll look at Henry's explanation of this definition of a habit of mind and the difference between a habit and a disposition.
Here are some ways to look at this. We might ask whether thinking of something is (a) relatively easy or (b) takes some effort, and whether your thought has (c) simple or (d) propositional intentional content (what do you think when you think of something). If (a) - (d) are sufficiently helpful, we get the following combinations.
1. (a) Some items we can think about fairly easily, and (c) the content is simple. We would use a single term like 'feline' or 'boring' and not any complete sentences (propositions) to think of the item(s).
2. (a) Some items we can think about fairly easily, and (d) the content is propositional. We would use a sentence or sentences to think of something.
3. (b) Some items we can think about only if we work at it, and (c) the content is simple. Suppose I cannot name an object that I interact with everyday, and so I stand there saying things like, 'the, uhh.. y'know.. the uhhh...... the corkscrew!'
4. (b) Some items we can think about only if we work at it, and (d) the content is propositional. Suppose deep in my memory I know lots about the 1980-81 Baseball season, but for the life of me I cannot recall it right now. But, after working at it awhile (perhaps like Google taking longer than normal to complete a search) I begin to tell you lots and lots of things about the 1980-81 Baseball season.
Suppose that (1)-(4) are sufficiently representative of the various ways we might consider someone's 'being able to think of something'.
Now, we might ask, what explains (1), (2), (3), and (4). We can at least say that the conditions for each are not exactly the same. To give full attention to each would take some time. Some philosophers might begin with easier cases and go from there. That is exactly what medieval philosophers usually do. They usually begin with (1) and move to (2), then (3) and (4). I don't mean that in every case a scholastic philosopher discusses (1), then (2), then (3), and then (4), but that this order describes generally how they go about it. In fact, most begin with (1), and (2)-(4) are up for grabs.
So far as I am aware, Henry of Ghent spends most of his efforts on (1) and (2). It seems to me that we can take what Henry says of (1) and (2) and try to construct what he would say about (3) and (4). Still, there are one or two places in which Henry tries to explain how we can undo our ability to think of something in a certain way. This isn't exactly the same as (3) and (4), but it's in the family--how can I try to get rid of the way I normally think of something?
Following Aristotle's discussion of qualities in his Categories, Henry posits that 'being able to think of something' comes in two ways, either because I have an intellectual condition or I have an intellectual state. Henry calls a condition by the name 'disposition' and a state by the name 'habit'. A condition/disposition is that by which you can think of something right now but it won't be easily accessible to you for long. A state/habit is that by which you can think of something right now and it will remain relatively easily accessible to you indefinitely.
Henry gives the following definition of a habit of mind:
"a habit is a quality that is generated in one who moves himself/herself by a cognitive desire in an action that presupposes a motion from another",
alternatively translated,
"a habit is a quality that is generated in one who moves himself/herself by a cognitive desire in an action from that which is moved from another."
[= [habitus est] qualitas generata in movente seipsum per appetitum cognitivum in actionem ex eo quod est ex alio motum]
Next time we'll look at Henry's explanation of this definition of a habit of mind and the difference between a habit and a disposition.
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